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Abstract
In the insurance industry, the number of product-specific policies from different
companies has increased significantly. The strong market competition has boosted
the demand for a competitive premium. In actuarial science, scant literature still ex-
ists on how competition actually affects the calculation and the cycles of company’s
premiums. In this paper, we model premium dynamics via differential games, and
study the insurers’ equilibrium premium dynamics in a competitive market. We
apply an optimal control theory methodology to determine the open-loop Nash
equilibrium premium strategies. The market power of each insurance company is
characterized by a price sensitive parameter, and the business volume is affected
by the solvency ratio. We study two models. Considering the average market pre-
miums, the first model studies an exponential relation between premium strategies
and volume of business. The second model initially characterizes the competition
between any selected pair of insurers, and then aggregates all the paired compe-
titions in the market. Numerical examples illustrate the premium dynamics, and
show that premium cycles may exist in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This paper constructs two models for determining the premium of general policies in
competitive, non-cooperative, insurance markets. In the corresponding literature, there
is still little research done on how the insurance premium follows from competition, and
responds to changes initiated by competitors (Taylor, 1986; Daykin and Hey, 1990; Emms,
2012; Pantelous and Passalidou, 2015; Wu and Pantelous, 2017). Moreover, despite the
fact that in many lines of insurance the presence of underlying cycles has been observed
empirically, there is a constant endeavour to understand the dynamics of insurance pre-
miums (Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Rantala, 1988; Doherty and Kang, 1988; Daykin
et al., 1994; Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997;
Taylor, 2008; Malinovskii, 2010).
Furthermore, as it is observed in practice, the competition among insurance companies
is getting stronger. Moreover, the domination of oligopoly markets is reflected often
in the determination of insurance premiums (Friedman, 1982). Thus, a fair, but also
commercially attractive premium is not any more a product of a simple risk assessment
exercise, but a highly challenging decision-making process. Consequently, the demand
of mathematical models is more essential than ever to investigate the interconnectivity
among the competitors in the corresponding markets1 and to understand the formulation
of premium cycles.
1.2 Developments in Competitive Insurance Markets
Over the last three decades, academics have been interested in investigating on how
competition might affect insurance premiums and how insurers respond to changes in the
premium levels that being offered by competitors.
In actuarial science, Taylor (1986) pointed out that competition is a key component
1In this paper, we are interested in local markets. Thus, we should emphasize that competition is
formulated at a local (national) level. Moreover, every insurer is regulated by the same competition and
market’s authority.
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in insurance premium pricing. He embedded the law of demand to analyse the change
of exposure volume through a comparison between the insurer’s and market average pre-
miums. Later, Taylor (1987) noted that the optimum underwriting strategies might be
substantially affected by the expense rates.2 Emms and his co-authors were able to extend
significantly Taylor (1986, 1987)’s ideas developing a series of models in continuous time
by implementing a variety of optimal control theory techniques (Emms and Haberman,
2005; Emms, 2007a,b; Emms et al., 2007; Emms and Haberman, 2009). In this paper,
we defer from these approaches by modelling the competition via the open-loop Nash
equilibrium.
1.3 Game-theoretic approaches for insurance markets
In a control theory framework as presented in Section 1.2, a single insurer’s objective
function is optimized considering the market information as inputs. However, as a key
assumption, a premium strategy does not cause any reaction to the rest of the market’s
competitors.
Instead of focussing on a single insurer, we propose to model the entire insurance
markets’ premium competition by constructing an insurance game. Then, each insurer
is a player in the game, with its premium as a strategy. The entire market’s premium
profile can be obtained by solving the Nash Equilibrium (hereafter referred to as NE) of
the corresponding game.
The use of game theory in actuarial science has a long history. The first attempts
go back to Borch (1962, 1974), Bu¨hlmann (1980, 1984), and Lemaire (1984, 1991), who
applied cooperative games to model insurer and reinsurer risk transfer; see also other
extensions and reviews (Aase, 1993; Brockett and Xia, 1995; Tsanakas and Christofides,
2006). Two models were applied in non-life insurance markets for non-cooperative games:
a) the Bertrand oligopoly in which insurers set premiums and b) the Cournot oligopoly
in which insurers choose the volume of business.3 Boonen (2016) also proposed a way to
2In discrete-time, Taylor’s approach has been revisited recently, and linear as well as non-linear stochas-
tic demand functions were considered (Pantelous and Passalidou, 2013, 2015, 2017).
3For the Bertrand model see (Polborn, 1998; Rees et al., 1999; Dutang et al., 2013), and for the
Cournot model see (Powers et al., 1998; Powers and Shubik, 1998).
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optimally regulate bargaining for risk redistributions. He studied the strategic interaction
between two insurance companies that trade risk over-the-counter in a one-period model.
Emms (2012) considered a model by applying a differential game-theoretic methodol-
ogy for non-cooperative markets. Under his framework, each insurer’s premium depends
on other insurers’ premium strategies, assuming that each market participant chooses an
optimal premium strategy. Insurers’ premium strategies are obtained by calculating the
NE of the game. Recently, Wu and Pantelous (2017) introduced the concept of aggregate
games based on a one-period framework which aggregates market competition by initially
characterizing any selected paired insurers’ payoff. The existence of NE was guaranteed
by proving that the constructed game is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996;
Jensen, 2010).
1.4 Generalized finite-time differential game models: A new ap-
proach
In this paper, generalized finite-time differential games with a finite number of insurers
are constructed. The formulation allows us to investigate the mechanism for the premium
cycles by solving NE premium profiles. When the market reaches a NE, no insurer can
increase its profit by modifying its strategy given the optimal strategies of the other
insurers.
As in Emms (2012), the optimal control theory methodology is incorporated. Under a
continuous-time framework, the number of new contracts is modelled considering compe-
tition, while the loss of exposure due to policy termination is assumed to be proportional
to the current volume of exposure. In this direction, two competition-related models are
proposed, studied and compared: (1) Model I adopts the exponential demand function
of Taylor (1986, 1987) and Emms (2012) considering the market average premium; while,
(2) Model II is formulated based on the aggregate game developed in Wu and Pantelous
(2017).
The main innovations between the new approach, and respectively Emms (2012) for
Model I, and Wu and Pantelous (2017) for Model II can be summarized as follows. First,
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we analyse the effect of solvency ratio to exposure changes, which is developed further
in Model II. Second, the exposure change is separated between the marginal number of
new and the expired holding policies following Emms and Haberman (2005). Third, the
exponential function proposed by Taylor (1986) in discrete framework is adopted to model
the marginal number of new policies at a selected time point in Model I. Finally, in Model
II, the concept of aggregate games is adopted, and a generalized finite-time differential
game is formulated extending the one-period framework proposed by Wu and Pantelous
(2017).4
Modelling price sensitivity by a single parameter was initially proposed by Taylor
(2008), and it was further explored by Wu and Pantelous (2017). It uses the concept of
price elasticity of demand. In this study, a price sensitivity parameter is formulated as
the market power factor for optimization purposes. The solvency ratio is the capital per
unit of premium, and it is taken into consideration in the competition between each pair
of insurers, as it is observable by the policyholders. In Taylor (2008), it is stated that the
management department will adjust its actuarial premium with respect to the current
solvency ratio. Considering historical data, when the capital amount is relatively high
compared with actuarial premium value, insurance companies prefer to increase their
premium value. The reason is that the insurers are more confident to pay the claims
under this condition. Solvency ratios are observable due to rating agencies. In this
paper, we implement the concept of solvency ratio in the competition, and develop an
insurance game where the solvency ratio is embedded. In particular, we assume that if
the (observable) solvency ratio is high, the number of new contracts sold will be affected
less by other insurers’ premium strategies. Interestingly, premium cycles are observed
in the numerical example of Model II, even without the consideration of any stochastic
variables.5
4In another words, Model I is the natural extension of Taylor (1986, 1987) in continuous time and
under a game theoretical approach. On the other hand, Model II inherits all the good features of Model
I (and also the corresponding to it literature) in continuous time, and uses the concept of aggregation
games which was developed in Wu and Pantelous (2017).
5As it will be clear in the numerical example, Model II appears to capture well the presence of
underlying cycles, which was not the case in Emms (2012). According to the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first time that the underlying cycles of the premium are captured by a mathematical model which
considers competition in the market.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the construction of the two in-
surance market competition models. In Section 3, the optimization problem is formulated
for the two models, and the Hamiltonians are presented. Section 4 presents numerical
examples of those two models. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Construction
2.1 Basic Notation
In this part of section, the necessary notation and parameters involved in this paper are
introduced in Table 1. Next, the definition of the key parameters is provided for a better
understanding of the remaining paper:
[Insert Table 1 somewhere here]
2.2 Baseline model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of insurers in the insurance market, and T a given
future time. At every point in time t ∈ [0, T ], every insurer i ∈ N makes a decision to set
the premium pi(t) per unit of exposure. The decisions of all insurers in the market lead to
the state variable θi(t) = (ki(t), qi(t)), where ki(t) > 0 is the capital per unit of exposure of
insurer i, and qi(t) > 0 is the volume of exposure of insurer i, which represents the number
of policies. Denote Pi(t) = {pi(t′) : t′ ∈ [0, t]} and Θi(t) = {θi(t′) : t′ ∈ [0, t]}. Moreover,
we write M−i(t) = {Mj(t) : j ∈ N\{i}} for any N-valued function M , k˙i(t) = ddtki(t) and
q˙i(t) =
d
dt
qi(t).
In line with Emms and Haberman (2005), we assume that there is a fixed length τ > 0
of insurance policies, and all new policyholders are required to pay the current premium
rate pi(t). We illustrate in Figure 1 how the underwriting of policies affects the exposure
volume qi(t) of the insurer. The dashed line displays the volume of exposure (policies) at
time t, which is q(t). Jumps up are due to newly sold policies, and jumps down are due
to policy terminations. Moreover, for every t, the top solid line displays the aggregate
number of policies that is accrued since time 0.
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[Insert Figure 1 somewhere here]
The change in exposure at any time t can be split up into the exposure generated by
selling new contracts and the exposure lost due to policy termination. Next, we identify
the details of those two effects. To obtain a Markov model and use conventional control
theory, we follow Emms and Haberman (2005) by assuming that the loss due to policy
termination is given by 1
τ
qi(t) for any insurer i. This implies that the policies expire at a
rate that is proportional to the number of policies in the portfolios of insurer i. In other
words, if insurer i has qi(t) policies that each have a duration of length τ , then the policies
terminate according to a uniform distribution, yielding a rate of policy termination that
is given by 1
τ
qi(t). Then, the state equation of exposure for insurer i is given by
q˙i(t) = mi(t)qi(t)− 1
τ
qi(t), (2.1)
where mi(t) is the marginal number of new policies sold at time t per unit of exposure.
Typically, the value of mi(t) depends on the premiums in the market (pi(t), p−i(t)) and
the state variable ki(t).
Define Ii(t, t+∆t) as the premium income of insurer i in period [t, t+∆t) and Ci(t, t+
∆t) as the cost of holding capital. Here, we assume that the premiums are paid at
the beginning of each contract and all insurance policies have a fixed length τ , and so
Ii(t, t+ ∆t) is the premium income of the new contracts generated. We get from a Taylor
series approximation that:
Ii(t, t+ ∆t) = pi(t)mi(t) qi(t) ∆t+O(∆t
2),
where f(∆t) = O(∆t2) is such that lim sup∆t→0 |f(∆t)∆t2 | <∞.
Define β ∈ (0, 1) as the depreciation of capital. The cost of holding capital Ci(t, t+∆t)
during the period [t, t+ ∆t) is given by
Ci(t, t+ ∆t) = β Ki(t) ∆t+O(∆t
2).
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Moreover, define pii > 0 as the break-even premium of insurer i, that is the deterministic
insurance claim that needs to be paid per unit of exposure (Taylor, 1986; Emms and
Haberman, 2005; Emms, 2012; Wu and Pantelous, 2017). So, the insurer needs to pay
pii qi(t) ∆t + O(∆t
2) for insurance claims during the period [t, t + ∆t). The total capital
for insurer i at time t+ ∆t is given by
Ki(t+ ∆t) = Ki(t) + Ii(t, t+ ∆t)− Ci(t, t+ ∆t)− pii qi(t) ∆t+O(∆t2)
= Ki(t) +
(
pi(t)mi(t)− pii − β ki(t)
)
qi(t)∆t+O(∆t
2).
The volume of the insurer’s exposure is also modified considering the entry of new
business and the expiration of existing policies. The difference of capital per unit of
exposure in period [t, t+ ∆t) equals to
∆ki(t) = ki(t+ ∆t)− ki(t)
=
Ki(t+ ∆t)
qi(t+ ∆t)
− ki(t)
=
Ki(t+ ∆t)
qi(t) + q˙i(t)∆t
− ki(t) +O(∆t2)
=
ki(t) +
(
pi(t)mi(t)− pii − β ki(t)
)
∆t
1 +
(
mi(t)− 1τ
)
∆t
− ki(t) +O(∆t2)
=
(
pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
β +mi(t)− 1
τ
))
∆t+O(∆t2),
by using a Taylor series approximation. Therefore, the state equation of capital per
exposure for insurer i is given by
k˙i(t) = pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
β +mi(t)− 1
τ
)
. (2.2)
For a given time period [0, T ], we assume that every insurer i ∈ N aims to maximize
the net present value of its profit. This objective is in line with Emms (2012), and the
objective function for insurer i ∈ N is given by
ui(Pi(T ); Θi(T )) =
∫ T
0
e−ζtFi(pi(t); θi(t))dt. (2.3)
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Here, ζ is the discount factor, and
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) = (pi(t)mi(t)− pii − βki(t))qi(t). (2.4)
A set of control functions t 7→ (p∗1(t), p∗2(t), . . . , p∗n(t)) is a NE for the game within the
class of open-loop strategies if the following holds. For any insurer i, the control p∗i (·)
provides a solution to the optimal control problem:
maximize ui(Pi(T ); Θi(T )), (2.5)
over the set of controllers, Pi(T ), where the set of controllers of other insurers, P−i(T ),
is feasible, and the system has dynamics: {p1(0), . . . , pn(0)} and {θ1(0), . . . , θn(0)} given,
and (2.1) and (2.2) hold:
k˙i(t) = pi(t)mi(t)− pii − ki(t)
(
β +mi(t)− 1
τ
)
,
q˙i(t) = mi(t)qi(t)− 1
τ
qi(t),
for all i ∈ N.
The rate of selling policies mi is affected by market competition, and not yet spec-
ified. To model mi explicitly, we propose two models in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 that are
denoted by Model I and Model II, respectively. Inspired by Taylor (1986, 1987) and
Emms (2012), Model I investigates exponential relations between exposure volume and
premium competition. On the other hand, Model II characterizes exposure volume re-
garding the aggregation of competition among all the pairs of insurers. The price elasticity
function concept is adopted to investigate the exposure volume change in Model II, as an
extension of Wu and Pantelous (2017) to a dynamic setting.
2.3 Model I Formulation
Model I adopts the exponential demand function proposed in Taylor (1986, 1987) and
Emms (2012) for modelling the competition between any pair of insurers. Let us define
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the function ρi of insurer i at time t by
ρi(t) = −(pi(t)− p¯−i(t)),
where p¯−i(t) is the average premium of all the other insurers in insurance market except
i. When ρi(t) is positive, insurer i’s premium pi(t) is less than p¯−i(t); then we assume
that insurer i gains exposure in the insurance market. Policies flow in a reverse manner
when ρi is negative. We model the rate of selling new policies mi(t) for insurer i at time
t as
mi(t) =
1
τ
ri e
bi ρi(t)− pi(t)ki(t) , (2.6)
where bi > 0 is the price sensitivity parameter of insurer i ∈ N, and ri > 0 is a benchmark
solvency ratio for insurer i.
In line with the exponential demand function in Taylor (1986, 1987), we initially model
mi(t) as
1
τ
ebiρi(t). When pi(t) < p¯−i(t), then 1τ e
biρi(t) is larger than 1
τ
. We further augment
this effect with an influence of the solvency ratio on competition, which is a new concept
in our paper. The solvency ratio is defined as ki(t)
pi(t)
. Since Taylor (2008) assumed that
the management department adjusts the actuarial premium by comparing the insurer’s
current solvency ratio and a benchmark solvency ratio, we augment m with the factor
rie
− pi(t)
ki(t) .6 When the solvency ratio ki(t)
pi(t)
increases, the rate of selling new policies mi(t)
increases, which describes the effect that insurers with larger solvency ratios can obtain
more policies.
2.4 Model II Formulation
As proposed by Wu and Pantelous (2017), Model II initially specifies the flow of policies
between any pair of insurers. The entire insurance market competition can be evaluated
by aggregating among the different pairs of insurers. For any insurer j, let us define the
6An augmentation with rie
ki(t)
pi(t) would lead to an ill-posed problem, and it is therefore avoided.
10
transfer function ρj→i(t) from insurer j to insurer i at time t as follows
ρj→i(t) = 1− pi(t)
pj(t)
.
At time t, when insurer i’s premium is less than insurer j’s premium, insurer j’s
policies tend to flow to insurer i. Policies flow in a reverse direction when pi(t) > pj(t).
We assume that the exposure flow from insurer j to insurer i is given by
qj→i(t) = ai ρj→i(t)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t), (2.7)
where ai > 0 is the price sensitivity parameter of insurer i, and ri > 0 is a benchmark
solvency ratio for insurer i. Typically, we have qj→i(t) 6= −qi→j(t). The exposure changes
over time follow from the competition in the entire market. It is obtained by summing up
all the bilateral policies’ gains or losses. The aggregate exposure gain or loss for insurer i
is then given by
q˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
qj→i(t). (2.8)
We allow
∑
i∈N q˙i(t) to be not equal to zero, since potential customers may enter (leave)
the insurance market when the premiums are low (high).
Substituting (2.7) and (2.8) in (2.1) yields that the rate of selling new policies for
insurer i at time t in Model II is given by
mi(t) =
1
τ
+ ai
1
ri
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
. (2.9)
3 Theoretical Results
As it was discussed in Section 2, the NE premium strategy for the ith insurer follows from
a maximization problem over the set of feasible premium strategies given the feasible
premium strategies of the other insurers (Dockner et al., 2000). Thus, in this section, the
corresponding Hamiltonians and related results for Models I and II are presented.
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3.1 Optimisation Problem for Model I
From (2.4)-(2.6), we derive that the marginal profit for insurer i is given by
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) =
(
pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − β ki(t)
)
qi(t). (3.1)
We obtain the following dynamics for the state variables of insurer i:
k˙i(t) = pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii
−ki(t)
(
β +
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
τ
)
, (3.2)
and
q˙i(t) =
(
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
1
τ
qi(t). (3.3)
With the objective function and state equations, the Hamiltonian for the ith insurer is
given by7
Hi = e
−ζt
(
pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − β ki(t)
)
qi(t)
+
∑
j∈N
µij(t)
[
pj(t)
1
τ
rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − pij
−kj(t)
(
β +
1
τ
rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
τ
)]
+
∑
j∈N
λij(t)
(
rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
1
τ
qj(t). (3.4)
For any i, j ∈ N, the adjoint equations are given by
dλij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qj(t)
, λij(T ) = 0, (3.5)
dµij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂kj(t)
, µij(T ) = 0. (3.6)
The next lemma provides the solution of (3.5) and (3.6) for j 6= i.
7With slight abuse of notation, we do not explicitly write that the Hamiltonian depends on
(pi(t), p−i(t), θi(t)).
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Lemma 1. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ N such that j 6= i, it holds that λij(t) = 0 and
µij(t) = 0.
Proof. For j 6= i, it holds that
dλij(t)
dt
= −λij(t)
(
rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
1
τ
. (3.7)
Let A =
(
rj e
bj (p¯−j(t)−pj(t))− pj(t)kj(t) − 1
)
1
τ
. When A 6= 0, we have
∣∣∣∣∣ dλij(t)Aλij(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ = dt⇔
∫ ∣∣∣∣∣ dλij(t)Aλij(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∫
dt⇔ ln∣∣λij(t)∣∣ = |At|+ c
and, hence, we get
∣∣λij(t)∣∣ = e|A·t|+c. With λij(T ) = 0, it is a contradiction.
When A = 0, we have λij(t) = 0 by construction. Hence λij(t) = 0, when j 6= i.
We can prove that µij(t) = 0 for all j 6= i in a similar way.
Using Lemma 1, the Hamiltonian in (3.4) simplifies to
Hi = e
−ζt
(
pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − β ki(t)
)
qi(t)
+µii(t)
[
pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii
−ki(t)
(
β +
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
τ
)]
+λii(t)
(
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
1
τ
qi(t). (3.8)
From the adjoint equations, we have
dλii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qi(t)
= −e−ζt
(
pi(t)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − pii − β ki(t)
)
−λii(t)
(
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − 1
)
1
τ
, (3.9)
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and
dµii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂ki(t)
= −e−ζt qi(t)
(
pi(t)
2
ki(t)
2
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) − β
)
−µii(t)
[
− β − 1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) +
1
τ
+
(
pi(t)− ki(t)
) pi(t)
ki(t)
2
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
]
−λii(t) pi(t)
ki(t)
2
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) qi(t). (3.10)
The first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian, defined in (3.8), are given by
∂Hi
∂pi(t)
= e−ζt qi(t)
(
pi(t)
(
−bi − 1
ki(t)
)
+ 1
)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+µii(t)
[ (
pi(t)− ki(t)
) (−bi − 1
ki(t)
)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
]
+λii(t) qi(t)
(
−bi − 1
ki(t)
)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) . (3.11)
which must equal zero for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N. The second-order conditions of the
Hamiltonians are given by
∂2Hi
∂pi(t)
2 = e
−ζt qi(t)
(
2
(
−bi − 1
ki(t)
)
+
(
bi +
1
ki(t)
)2)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+µii(t)
[
2
(
−bi − 1
ki(t)
)
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
+
(
pi(t)− ki(t)
) (
bi +
1
ki(t)
)2
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t)
]
+λii(t) qi(t)
(
bi +
1
ki(t)
)2
1
τ
ri e
bi (p¯−i(t)−pi(t))− pi(t)ki(t) . (3.12)
It is well-known in optimal control theory that the solution of the first-order conditions
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is a NE when the second-order conditions of Hamiltonians in (3.12) are non-positive for
all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N (Friesz, 2010).
3.2 Optimisation Problem for Model II
For Model II, the marginal profit for insurer i is given by
Fi(pi(t); θi(t)) =
pi(t)
1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − β ki(t)
 qi(t).
(3.13)
Similarly to (3.2)-(3.3), we derive the following state equations
k˙i(t) = pi(t)
1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

−pii − ki(t)
β + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
 , (3.14)
q˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t). (3.15)
With the objective function and state equations, the Hamiltonian for insurer i is given by
Hi = e
−ζt
pi(t)
1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − β ki(t)
 qi(t)
+
∑
j∈N
µij(t)
[
pj(t)
1
τ
+
∑
`∈N,`6=j
aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj

−pij − kj(t)
β + ∑
`∈N,` 6=j
aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj
]
+
∑
j∈N
λij
 ∑
`∈N,` 6=j
aj
(
1− pj(t)
p`(t)
)
e
pj(t)
kj(t)
rj
qj(t)
 . (3.16)
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For any i, j ∈ N, the adjoint equations are given by
dλij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qj(t)
, λij(T ) = 0, (3.17)
dµij(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂kj(t)
, µij(T ) = 0. (3.18)
The next lemma provides the solution of (3.17) and (3.18) for j 6= i.
Lemma 2. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ N such that j 6= i, it holds that λij(t) = 0 and
µij(t) = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1, and so it is omitted.
Due to Lemma 2, the Hamiltonian in (3.16) simplifies to
Hi = e
−ζt
pi(t)
1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − β ki(t)
 qi(t)
+ µii(t)
[
pi(t)
τ−1 1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

−pii − ki(t)
β + ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
]
+ λii
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
qi(t)
 . (3.19)
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From the adjoint equations, we get
dµii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂ki(t)
= −e−ζt qi(t),
[
pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))

−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)]
−µii(t)
[ (
pi(t)− ki(t)
)  ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
− β
−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
]
−λii qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
 , (3.20)
and
dλii(t)
dt
= − ∂Hi
∂qi(t)
= −e−ζt
pi(t)
1
τ
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− pii − β ki(t)

−λii
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
 . (3.21)
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The first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian in (3.19) are given by
∂Hi
∂pi(t)
= e−ζt qi(t)
[
1
τ
+
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

+pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
]
+µii(t)
[
1
τ
+
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri

− (pi(t)− ki(t))
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
]
+λii(t) qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
 , (3.22)
which must equal zero for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N.
The first-order conditions of the Hamiltonians yield a NE if the second order conditions
are satisfied. The second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians in (3.19) are given by
∂2Hi
∂ri(t)
2 = e
−ζt qi(t)
[
2
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)

+pi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
−2ki(t) + pj(t)− pi(t)
ki(t)
2 pj(t)
)]
+µii(t)
[
2
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
− 1
pj(t)
+
1
ki(t)
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)

+
(
pi(t)− ki(t)
)  ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(
−2ki(t) + pj(t)− pi(t)
ki(t)
2 pj(t)
)]
+λii(t) qi(t)
 ∑
j∈N,j 6=i
ai
(
1− pi(t)
pj(t)
)
e
pi(t)
ki(t)
ri
(−(ki(t))2 pi(t))
 , (3.23)
which must be non-positive for all t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ N.
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4 Numerical Application
In this section, a numerical application for both models is formulated in a competitive
insurance market environment. In the Appendix, the relevant steps using the Matlab
programming language for Model I (Section 4.1) and Model II (Section 4.2) are presented
in details. For simplicity and better understanding of the numerous parameters involved,
an insurance market with two competitors is considered.
4.1 Model I
A two insurers’ game is constructed with Insurer 1 and Insurer 2. In Section 3.1, we
obtained ten variables (p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, and λ22), two first-order
conditions of the Hamiltonian, and eight ODEs (k˙1, k˙2, q˙1, q˙2, µ˙11, µ˙22, λ˙11, and λ˙22).
When (3.11) equals zero, the two players’ equilibrium premiums are not correlated.
That is, the premium of is decoupled. This implies that marginal premium p˙1 for Insurer
1 can be obtained by differentiating the corresponding solution of p1 from (3.11) with
respect to time t, where we do not need to consider the correlation with the price changes
of Insurer 2.8 Likewise, we obtain p˙2. Under this framework, we have ten variables which
correspond to ten ODEs, accordingly. Considering the initial and terminal conditions, a
Bounded Value Problem (hereafter referred to as BVP) is formulated, which can be solved
numerically. In the following subsection, we describe the numerical steps to calculate of
the NE premium strategies.
4.1.1 Algorithm of Calculating Equilibrium Premium Strategy for Model I
In this section, the main steps of the algorithm are presented, whereas the Appendix
provides the details of the algorithm.
Step 1: Calculate p1, when the first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian for Insurer 1 in
(3.11) are satisfied.
Step 2: Differentiate p1 obtained in Step 1 with respect to time t to calculate p˙1.
8See Section 4.1.1 and Appendix for more details.
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Step 3: Repeat steps 1 and 2 with respect to Insurer 2 to calculate p˙2.
Step 4: We have ten variables, p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, and λ22 and the corresponding
ODEs. This is a BVP with six conditions from the initial information of both
insurers and four terminal conditions from (3.5) and (3.6), which we solve using the
”bvp45” function in Matlab.
Step 5: Test whether the second-order conditions of Hamiltonians for both insurers in (3.12)
are non-positive during the time interval [0, T ].9
4.1.2 Numerical Example of Model I
Here, we illustrate an insurance game considering a period of three years. We investigate
the competition among two candidates: one player represents a relatively small insurer
(Insurer 1), while the other one is regarded as a large insurer with substantial market
power (Insurer 2).
Table 2 shows the parameter values of our insurance game, and Table 3 the initial
information, including the initial premium, volume of exposure and capital per exposure
regarding both insurers. The insurance company with a greater market power (Insurer 2)
has a larger price sensitivity parameter b.
[Insert Table 2 somewhere here]
[Insert Table 3 somewhere here]
With the algorithm introduced in Section 4.1.1, a premium profile of both insurers is
calculated, which is presented in Figure 2, with non-positive second-order Hamiltonian
profiles occurred for both insurers. Since the second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians
are satisfied, the premium profiles that follow from the first-order conditions constitutes a
NE. Figures 3 and 4 describe the exposure volume and capital per exposure, respectively.
[Insert Figure 2 somewhere here]
[Insert Figure 3 somewhere here]
9The strategy profiles with positive second-order conditions will be neglected.
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[Insert Figure 4 somewhere here]
Although there is a slight decrease in the value of premium, the larger market power
of Insurer 2 yields that the equilibrium premium of Insurer 2 is kept at a relatively high
level over the whole time horizon. Insurer 1 adopts a relatively low premium level with
the purpose of absorbing more policies. Insurer 2 slightly lower its capital per exposure
through the competition while insurer’s capital per exposure inappreciably increased. No
cycles appear in the equilibrium premiums of Model I. The equilibrium strategies of the
two insurers keep stable over the 3-years period. Different sets of parameters are tested
for Model I, and none of the parameters yield any cycles.
4.2 Model II
Similarly to Section 4.1, we consider a game with Insurer 1 and Insurer 2. In Section 3.2,
we obtained ten variables (p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, and λ22), two first-order
conditions of the Hamiltonian for the two insurers, and eight ODEs (k˙1, k˙2, q˙1, q˙2, µ˙11,
µ˙22, λ˙11, and λ˙22).
We can eliminate two variables p2 and λ22
10, and substitute λ˙22 to the differential
equation of p1. Under these circumstances, we take eight variables which correspond to
eight ODEs, accordingly. The backward integration considers the standard Mean Value
Theorem, which is adopted in this section in order to solve the BVP.
4.2.1 Algorithm of Calculating Equilibrium Premium Strategy for Model II
In this section, the main steps of the algorithm are presented, whereas the Appendix
provides the details of the algorithm.
Step 1: Calculate p2 when the first-order condition of the Hamiltonian in (3.22) for Insurer
1 is satisfied.
Step 2: Get an expression of λ22 from the first-order condition of insurer 2’s Hamiltonian,
with p2 replaced by the solution of Insurer 1’s first order condition of Hamiltonian
10See Step 1 in the algorithm presented in Section 4.2.1 and Appendix. We get an expression for p2,
which will be substituted from the solution of Insurer 1’s first order condition of Hamiltonian in (3.22).
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(3.22) calculated in Step 1.
Step 3: Differentiate the expression of λ22 with respect to time t. Generate an ODE for p1.
Step 4: Apply a backward iteration of the system with the first-order conditions of Hamil-
tonian for insurer 1 and 2. Terminal values of ten variables are required to be used
as inputs. From (3.17) and (3.18), it follows that µ11(T ) = µ22(T ) = λ11(T ) =
λ22(T ) = 0. For the other 6 variables, p1(T ), p2(T ), k1(T ), k2(T ), q1(T ), q2(T ) need
to satisfy (3.22) in order to be used as inputs.
Since µ11(T ) = µ22(T ) = λ11(T ) = λ22(T ) = 0, (3.22) does not depend on q1(T ) and
q2(T ) at time T . We use the Matlab solver ’fsolve’ to provide p1(T ), p2(T ) when
k1(T ), k2(T ) are fixed, via (3.22).
Then, we guess q1(T ) and q2(T ). Terminal values of the 10 variables are used as
inputs in the backward iteration.
Step 5: Stop until the initial values of p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, and q2 from backward iteration
equals to the initial data value. Otherwise, we adjust the guess of k1(T ), k2(T ),
q1(T ), and q2(T ).
11
Step 6: From the previous step, we collect the terminal values that yield the correct initial
values. We check whether the second-order conditions of the Hamiltonians of both
insurers are non-positive during the time interval [0, T ].12
Remark 1. A NE of a game with more insurers can also be obtained applying similar
algorithms to those in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. However, as it is expected that more loops
are required and the corresponding computational cost will increase in order to calculate
the NE premium strategy.
4.2.2 Numerical Example of Model II
We introduce in this section a 3-year insurance game. Similarly to Model I, we study nu-
merically the competition among a large insurer with market power and a relatively small
11The Algorithmic Steps for Model II in the Appendix shows the guess only of k1(T ).
12Similarly to the algorithm for Model I, we will neglect the strategy profiles with positive second-order
conditions.
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insurer. The insurance company with greater market power has a lower price sensitivity
parameter a. As it was the case in Wu and Pantelous (2017), the Lerner index is consid-
ered for a. The Lerner index is a market power measurement which describes the inverse
correlation between market performance and profit margin for monopolist environments
(Lerner, 1934).
Table 4 states the chosen parameter values. Table 5 illustrates the initial information
of the two insurers.
[Insert Table 4 somewhere here]
[Insert Table 5 somewhere here]
With the algorithm introduced in Section 4.2.1, a NE premium profile for the two
insurers is calculated, which is shown in Figure 5. Similarly as for Model I, verification
that it is a NE follows from the fact that the second-order Hamiltonians are non-positive
for both insurers. Figures 6 and 7 describe the exposure volume and capital per exposure,
accordingly. Premium cycles are observed in the whole time period. Figure 5 supports
the empirical evidence in the insurance literature (Cummins and Outreville, 1987; Do-
herty and Kang, 1988; Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Lamm-Tennant and
Weiss, 1997) that premium cycles in insurance markets are caused by market competi-
tion. Although the premiums between the two insurers are not proportional, the shape
of premium cycle profiles is similar. Figure 5 suggests that Insurer 1 follows Insurer 2’s
premium strategy. The premium of Insurer 1 even falls below the break-even premium
level from the 3rd month to the 6th month in order to remain competitive and attract
more policies. The two insurers’ total capital, displayed in Figure 8, remains stable for
the first two years. Due to the increment of premium, both insurers gain massive capital
in the third year, which is particularly true for Insurer 1.
[Insert Figure 5 somewhere here]
[Insert Figure 6 somewhere here]
[Insert Figure 7 somewhere here]
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[Insert Figure 8 somewhere here]
Different sets of parameters are tested for Model II, and premium cycles appear to be
related to the profit margins. When the break-even premium is relatively low compared to
the premium, insurers intend to compete with their rivals, and more cycles appear. Figure
9 shows the equilibrium premium profiles where the break-even premiums are increased
to pi1 = 0.8 and pi2 = 0.85, while the other parameters remain the same as they appear
in Tables 4 and 5. In Figure 9, we find premium cycles, but with longer periods; while
both insurers’ equilibrium premium slightly increased smoothly over the time horizon.
For instance, Figure 10 shows the NE premium profiles where the break-even premiums
are given by pi1 = 1.2 and pi2 = 1.1.
[Insert Figure 9 somewhere here]
[Insert Figure 10 somewhere here]
5 Conclusion
This paper studies two finite-time differential games in an insurance market. It provides
how competition impacts the premium process of non-life insurance products. An optimal
control theory approach is applied to determine premiums in the open-loop Nash Equi-
librium. The first model (Model I) adopts the exponential demand function proposed
by Taylor (1986, 1987) and Emms (2012), and the second model (Model II) is formu-
lated based on the aggregate exposure proposed by Wu and Pantelous (2017). Numerical
examples illustrate the premium dynamics, and show that premium cycles do exist in
equilibrium for the Model II.
As a future research, we are interested in applying stochastic models to dynamic games.
Another possible extension would be to study feedback Nash equilibria for dynamic games.
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APPENDIX
Algorithmic Steps using Matlab Programming for Model
I
The steps 1, 2 and 4 are presenting using Matlab:
Matlab - Step 1:
% Type in (3.11) with respect to Insurer 1, denoted as firstorderH1.
1: x1=solve(firstorderH1 ==0, p1).
Matlab - Step 2:
% Create symbolic variables with respect to t;
1: odex1=diff(x1(t), t).
% odex1 includes diff (k1(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff (λ11(t), t), diff (µ11(t), t) .
% Replace the differential equations in odex1 with their expressions,
see (3.2), (3.3), (3.9), and (3.10). p˙1 is obtained.
Matlab - Step 4:
1: init=bvpinit(linspace(0,3,1000),@bc init);
2: sol=bvp4c(@rhs bvp,@bc bvp,init);
3: t=linspace(0,3,1000);
4: BS=deval(sol,t);
5: plot(t,BS(1,:));
6: function rhs=rhs bvp(t,y);
7: rhs=[ p˙1; p˙2;k˙1;k˙2;q˙1;q˙2;µ˙11;µ˙22;λ˙11;λ˙22] ;
8: function bc=bc bvp(yl, yr);
9: bc=[yl(1)-0.88; yl(2)-1.05; yl(3)-0.6; yl(4)-1; yr(5)-5225; yr(6)-13700;
yr(7); yr(8); yr(9); yr(10)];
10: end.
% @bc init is the initial guess of this BVP.13
13See matlab code ’solinit ’ for more details.
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Algorithmic Steps using Matlab Programming for Model
II
The steps 1 to 5 are presenting using Matlab:
Matlab - Step 1:
% Type in (3.22) with respect to Insurer 1, denoted as FirstorderH1.
1: x2=solve(FirstorderH1 ==0, p2).
Matlab - Step 2:
% Type in (3.22) for Insurer 2, denoted as FirstorderH2 .
1: FirstorderH2 fh=matlabFunction(FirstorderH2 ) ;
2: FirstorderH2 new=FirstorderH2 fh(a2,r2,τ
−1,ζ,t,p1,x2,k2,q2,µ22,λ22) ;
3: x10=solve(FirstorderH2 new==0,λ22).
Matlab - Step 3:
% Create symbolic variables with respect to t;
1: dx10=diff(x10(t), t);
% dx10 includes diff (p1(t), t), diff (k1(t), t), diff (k2(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff
(q2(t), t), diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (µ22(t), t), diff (λ11(t), t). (3.15), (3.16),
(3.20), and (3.21) provide all the above differential equations, except
diff (p1(t), t).
% Replace diff (k1(t), t), diff (k2(t), t), diff (q1(t), t), diff (q2(t), t),
diff (µ11(t), t) , diff (µ22(t), t), diff (λ11(t), t) with the corresponding
differential equations in dx10, which is denoted as x 10. x 10 includes
ten variables p1, p2, k1, k2, q1, q2, µ11, µ22, λ11, and λ22 and diff (p1(t), t) ;
2: x 10 - diff (λ22(t), t) == 0
% x 10 is the derivative of λ22(t) with respect to t which satisfies both two
insurers’ first-order conditions of Hamiltonians. Regarding diff (λ22(t), t)
from (3.21), an equation of diff (p1(t), t) is obtained through the above equation.
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Matlab - Step 4:
1: x0=[0.000001 0.000001];
2: p=fsolve(@premium,x0);
3: function F = premium(u);
% Replace p1 as u(1), p2 as u(2) in
∂H1
∂p1
and ∂H2
∂p2
.
4: F = [ ∂H1
∂p1
; ∂H2
∂p2
] ;
5: end.
% Given by the terminal values kT1 , k
T
2 , q
T
1 , q
T
2 , the terminal value of p1
and p2 are calculated by solving F with variable vector u regarding
µT11 = µ
T
22 = λ
T
11 = λ
T
22 = 0 ,
6: for i=N:-1:1;
7: t = (i-1) * T/(N-1) ;
% 8 ODE systems with 8 variables:
8: k1(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (k1(t), t) + k1(i);
k2(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (k2(t), t) + k2(i);
q1(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (q1(t), t) + q1(i);
q2(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (q2(t), t) + q2(i);
µ11(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (µ11(t), t) + µ11(i);
µ22(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (µ22(t), t) + µ22(i);
λ11(i− 1) = −dt ∗ diff (λ11(t), t) + λ11(i);
syms v
% Replace diff (p1(t), t) with an approximation of the first derivative
p1(i)−v
dt
. p1(i− 1) = vpasolve(x 10− diff (λ22(t), t) == 0, v);
% Replace p2, λ22 with x2, x10 correspondingly in all the above
equations.
9: end.
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Matlab - Step 5:
1: kT1 =linspace(1.6,2,9) ;
2: x0=[0.000001 0.000001];
3: Y=zeros(length(kT1 ),2);
4: for z=1:length(kT1 ) ;
5: fun= @(x)premium(x,kT1 (z)) ;
6: Y(z,:)=fsolve(fun,x0);
7: end.
8: for z=1:length(k1);
9: p1(N, z) = Y (:, 1); ...
% ”...” symbolises the assignment of terminal values, like k1(N, z) = k
T
1 (z),
k2(N, z) = 3, q1(N, z) = 5000. Unnecessary repetitions are omitted. See also Tables.
10: for i=N:-1:1;
11: W = [0,1];
...
% ”...” means that we have to use here the 8 ODE systems with 8 variables
mentioned in Step 4,
12: if (p1(1, z) > 0.885) && (p1(1, z) < 0.895) && (p2(1, z) > 1.535) &&
(p2(1, z) < 1.545) && ...
% ”...” describes all the initial values of insurers, such as premium, capital
and exposure. p2 at each stage i can be calculated through x2,
13: W(index,1)=[k1(z),1];
14: index = index +1;
15: end.
16: end.
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TABLES
N Set of insurers in the insurance market, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ N;
T Terminal time in the future;
t A moment in time, t ∈ [0, T ];
pi Premium value (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N ;
qi Exposure (volume of business) for insurer i ∈ N ,
which represents the number of policies (quantity) undertaken by insurer i ∈ N ;
ki Capital (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N ;
pii Break-even premium for insurer i ∈ N ;
mi Marginal number of new policies (at time t);
Ii Premium Income for insurer i ∈ N ;
Ki Total capital for insurer i ∈ N ;
Ci Total cost of holding capital for insurer i ∈ N ;
p¯−i Average premium of all the other insurers in insurance market except i ∈ N ;
β Depreciation of capital;
τ Fixed length of insurance policies;
ζ Discount rate, for the calculation of the net present value;
θ State variable, that includes ki, qi;
µ, λ Adjoint variables for q and k, respectively;
ai, bi Price sensitivity (positive) parameter of insurer i ∈ N ;
ui Objective function for insurer i ∈ N .
Table 1: Notation for the Model I & II.
Number of market participants n 2
Break-even premium of Insurer 1 pi1 0.6
Break-even premium of Insurer 2 pi2 0.609
Price sensitivity parameter of Insurer 1 b1 0.2
Price sensitivity parameter of Insurer 2 b2 0.28
Benchmark solvency ratio of Insurer 1 r1 3.3
Benchmark solvency ratio of Insurer 2 r2 2.2
Depreciation of capital β 0.03
Discount factor ζ 0.02
Table 2: Parameter values for Model I.
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Initial premium of Insurer 1 p1(0) 0.88
Initial premium of Insurer 2 p2(0) 1.05
Initial exposure volume of Insurer 1 q1(0) 5,225
Initial exposure volume of Insurer 2 q2(0) 13,700
Initial capital per exposure of Insurer 1 k1(0) 0.6
Initial capital per exposure of Insurer 2 k2(0) 1
Table 3: Initial information of Insurer 1 and Insurer 2.
Number of market participants n 2
Break-even premium of Insurer 1 pi1 0.6
Break-even premium of Insurer 2 pi2 0.61
Price sensitivity parameter of Insurer 1 a1 1.16
Price sensitivity parameter of Insurer 2 a2 0.87
Benchmark solvency ratio of Insurer 1 r1 2
Benchmark solvency ratio of Insurer 2 r2 3.5
Depreciation of capital β 0.03
Discount factor ζ 0.02
Table 4: Parameter values for Model II.
Initial premium of Insurer 1 p1(0) 0.89
Initial premium of Insurer 2 p2(0) 1.54
Initial exposure volume of Insurer 1 q1(0) 3,240
Initial exposure volume of Insurer 2 q2(0) 5,240
Initial capital per exposure of Insurer 1 k1(0) 1.28
Initial capital per exposure of Insurer 2 k2(0) 1.96
Table 5: Initial information of Insurer 1 and Insurer 2.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: The dashed line is the volume of exposure q(t) for time t, and the solid lines
denote the duration of policies with the same start date. Moreover, for every t, the top
solid line displays the aggregate number of policies that is accrued from time 0.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in Model
I. The blue line is Insurer 1’s premium and the red line is Insurer 2’s premium. The
premium is given on the y-axis while the corresponding time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 3: Volume of exposure profiles regarding both insurers over three years time in
Model I. The blue line is Insurer 1’s volume of exposure and the red line is Insurer 2’s
volume of exposure. The volume of exposure is given on the y-axis while the corresponding
time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 4: Exposure per capital profiles for both insurers over three years time in Model I.
The blue line is Insurer 1’s capital per exposure and the red line is Insurer 2’s capital per
exposure. The capital per exposure is given on the y-axis while the corresponding time
is on the x-axis.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in Model
II. The blue line is Insurer 1’s premium and the red line is Insurer 2’s premium. The
premium is given on the y-axis while the corresponding time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 6: Volume of exposure profiles regarding both insurers over three years time in
Model II. The blue line is Insurer 1’s volume of exposure and the red line is Insurer 2’s
volume of exposure. The volume of exposure is given on the y-axis while the corresponding
time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 7: Exposure per capital profiles regarding both insurers over three years time in
Model II. The blue line is Insurer 1’s capital per exposure and the red line is Insurer 2’s
capital per exposure. The capital per exposure is given on the y-axis while the corre-
sponding time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 8: Total capital profiles regarding both insurers over three years time in Model II.
The blue line is Insurer 1’s capital and the red line is Insurer 2’s capital. The capital is
given on the y-axis while the corresponding time is on the x-axis.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in Model
II, where pi1 = 0.8, and pi2 = 0.85. The blue line is Insurer 1’s premium and the red line
is Insurer 2’s premium. The premium is given on the y-axis while the corresponding time
is on the x-axis.
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Figure 10: Equilibrium premium profiles of both insurers over three years time in Model
II, where pi1 = 1.2, and pi2 = 1.1. The blue line is Insurer 1’s premium and the red line is
Insurer 2’s premium. The premium is given on the y-axis while the corresponding time
is on the x-axis.
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